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Highlights
Developed industrialised economies have been competing for highly skilled 
migrants for over 50 years. First policies on the matter date from the 1960s 
in Canada and the 1970s in Australia while the USA selective migration 
programme dates back to the early 1950s. However, competition among 
developed industrialised countries for highly skilled migrants has taken up 
new urgency in the last 15 years with the onset of the knowledge based 
economy and society. The UK was the first European country to develop 
an open high-skill migration policy in the late 1990s already, but other EU 
countries like the Netherlands or Germany followed suit in the mid 2000s. 
Five years after the adoption of the EU Blue Card scheme, developed to 
attract the best and brightest of the world to the European Union countries, 
data on the usage of the Blue Card scheme in selected member states show 
that the Directive has failed to achieve its objectives. Many critiques so 
far have focused on the low level of mobility that the Blue Card grants. 
When adopted by a member state, the Blue Card does not offer access to 
the EU labour market as a whole and is still related to rather cumbersome 
bureaucratic procedures if the highly skilled worker wants to take up a job 
in another EU country. 
Studies on Australia and the USA have shown that temporary migration 
visas addressing highly skilled migrants may create best opportunities for 
migrants and employers who sponsor them, Having high employment 
outcomes and good salaries, such migrants are usually enabled to move 
on to permanent settlement schemes smoothly. This Policy Brief focuses 
on the limitations that the Blue Card has with regard to the path that it 
offers to long term stay and settlement if the highly skilled migrant wishes, 
alongside the limited intra EU mobility rights that it grants. This Policy 
Brief suggests that the European Commission should launch a consultation 
with member states and relevant stakeholders with a view to making the 
Blue Card more attractive both for member states and for prospective high 
skill migrants from third countries.
1  Professor Anna Triandafyllidou <anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu> directs the 
Cultural Pluralism Research Area in the Global Governance Programme of the 
European University Institute. Dr Irina Isaakyan is Research Associate at the 
European University Institute, Global Governance Programme.
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Development of High Skill Migration Policies
The momentum gathered in the mid 2000s was 
however thwarted by the global financial and economic 
crisis, when OECD countries started to restrict their 
Immigration Laws. For example, in 2007 Sweden was 
indexed as a country with the most stringent entrance 
conditions for high-skill migrants. At the same time, 
the UK was noted for the most benevolent high skill 
migration policies while many EU countries (such as 
Germany and France) were placed in-between. A few 
years later, the HSM openness indexation drastically 
changed as EU countries had moved up and down the 
HSM openness scale and even switched places such as 
the case of the UK and Sweden. 
By 2008, the UK had turned indeed into a very 
flexible immigrant state, combining features of both 
the employer-based and points-based recruitment. Its 
groundbreaking innovation was Tier 1, which directly 
related to high-skill migrants and showed respect to their 
accumulated human capital, thus having enabled many 
of them to enter the UK without arranged employment. 
Two years later, however, the number of high-skill 
migrants became much higher than anticipated and 
the new government consequently closed the doors to 
HSM from outside of the EU by having imposed a very 
low cap on the number of permits for non-EU workers 
and having eventually abolished the Tier 1 initiative in 
2011. On the contrary, Sweden, which for many years 
sustained strict quotas for migrations, since 2008 has 
been consistently providing an unrestricted access for 
skilled migrants to its labour-market mostly on the 
basis of the employers’ demand and with maximum 
respect to such short-listed occupations as engineering 
and artistic jobs.
As is evident, economic contexts sometimes change 
rather drastically and unpredictably in Europe. So 
does the immigration law dynamics across its Member 
States. In the light of all this, it seems reasonable to ask: 
What would an EU level high skill migration scheme 
like the Blue Card offer to member states, employers 
and prospective migrants, acknowledging the different 
needs and dynamics of national labour markets?
The European Blue Card (BC)
Within the context of the expanding global crisis, the 
EU Blue Card Directive was adopted in a low profile 
mode in 2009 amidst the rising unemployment levels 
across the Eurozone. Seeking to make Europe more 
open for newcomers and more competitive in the world, 
the European Commission introduced the Blue Card 
Directive in May 2009. Twenty-four of the 27 Member 
States decided to participate in this programme in 
2012-2013. 
The Blue Card is an EU-wide work permit allowing 
high-skill non-EU citizens to work and live in any 
country within the EU, except Denmark, Ireland and 
the UK (which decided not to join the proposal). The 
main features of the Blue Card are that:
•   Qualified migrants from outside the EU have the 
right to work and reside in an EU country for a 
period of 1-4 years, after which the person may apply 
for a new Blue Card in the same or another member 
state. 
• During the first 18 months of admission, the high-
skill migrant is restricted to work in the country that 
issued the Blue Card. 
• For the initial issue of the Blue Card, the person must 
have an advanced degree, a minimum of a five-year 
professional experience in a high-skill area, and a 
valid job offer with at least a 1-year contract. 
• Alternatively, the person may already be employed 
in the Member State on a job contract that is valid for 
at least 1 year at the moment of application. 
• The Blue Card entrance salary must be at least 1.5 
higher than the average salary in the given Member 
State. 
• But these are minimal conditions and MS can modify 
them upwards asking for higher salary thresholds or 
more stringent qualification tests.
Challenges
Five years later, data on the Blue Card transposition 
in selected MS show disappointing results. Although 
the overall number of Blue Cards has grown almost 5 
times in one year: from 3,664 in 2012 to 15,261 in 2013, 
this increase has been contributed entirely by Germany 
(which issued 14,197 Blue Cards in 2013). Apart from 
Germany and Luxembourg, national HSM schemes 
significantly prevail in other MS.
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Even the migrant-friendly family reunification policy 
associated with the Blue Card does not save this project 
from failure.2  The weakness of the Blue Card Directive 
lies in its offering a basic framework for regulating high 
skill migration at an EU level albeit without proper 
mainstreaming in its implementation. The framework is 
quite flexible, too flexible perhaps, so that it very much 
depends on the political will of different MS and their 
governments on whether they frame their Blue Card 
schemes as more or less attractive than their equivalent 
national scheme for highly skilled workers. In addition 
the conditions for facilitating internal mobility within 
the EU for these non EU highly skilled workers are rather 
tenuous; the barriers remain too high for the scheme to 
use its EU character as a main point of attraction.
More specifically, the MS are given freedom to set 
additional conditions for the Blue Card implementation. 
In this connection, the Blue Card transposition 
stumbles over a number of barriers (Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, May 2014). 
Theoretically, Member States are given the choice to 
establish quotas for the number of Blue Cards, and 
eight Member States (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Malta, Romania and Slovenia) have actually 
decided to consider such an option in the future. 
Interestingly none of these countries is a country that 
lacks highly skilled personnel so as to have a likely 
strong high skill immigration influx. 
Twelve Member States (notably Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain) employ various 
types of a labour-market test as part of their Blue Card 
procedures. Unsurprisingly the large member states with 
a strong attraction potential like Germany or France or 
the flourishing economies of the Nordic countries or 
the Netherlands are missing from the list.
The maximum initial period of four years for which a 
Blue Card can be issued is shorter than the minimum 
residence requirement for applying for long term/
permanent residence. This difference can be quite 
significant (up to 3-4 years) as many countries issue 
the Blue Card for a maximum period of 2 years while 
the permanen t residence requirement stands at 5 years 
or more. The perspective of settlement that the Blue 
Card scheme offers is rather uncertain, thus making the 
system less attractive than national equivalents for third 
country nationals.  
For example, in Germany and Belgium, the Blue Card 
threshold is the same as the average national salary; 
while it is 1.5 times (or 50%) higher in France and the 
Netherlands; and 1.7 times (or 70%) higher in Sweden. 
In the majority of EU countries, the Blue Card threshold 
actually remains much higher than the average national 
salary, while required salaries for obtaining national 
work permits may be even lower than average national 
earnings. This factor makes high-skill applicants choose 
the traditional scheme of national HSM. For example, 
in the Baltic states of Latvia and Lithuania (which are 
leading hosts for qualified people from Russia and other 
post-Soviet republics), there is almost null  financial 
requirement for high-skill migrants who seek national 
work permits, whereas the required BC thresholds are 
respectively 50% and 200% higher than the average 
national salaries in these EU countries.
Salary Thresholds and Ratios Compared to Gross 
Annual Salaries in Selected Members State
BC threshold – the minimum financial requirement for 
the Blue Card
HS threshold – the minimum financial requirement for 
the national high-skill work permit
2     According to the BC family reunification strategy, the BC-hold-
ers’ spouses (of the opposite sex) and children under 18 are eligible 
to live in the MS; while the spouses are also eligible to work full-
time in the MS. Some EU countries implement even softer poli-
cies on family reunion, supporting the relocation and employment 
of unmarried partners (Sweden) and same-sex partners (Nether-
lands).
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Case 1. Tentative success: Germany and Luxembourg 
Germany
In Germany, there have been by now more than 10,000 Blue Cards issued. In relation to students who 
graduate from Germany universities, the BC incidence is especially striking: in a single calendar year, 
2013, the BC attracted 2,536 university graduates (compared with 1,796 for the previous 7 years in 2005-
2012). The German BC threshold salary for 2015 is 48,400 Euro in general and 37,752 Euro for shortage 
occupations.
Another supportive factor is that the BC in Germany is valid for the maximum allowed period of 4 years, 
which is longer than the minimum residential requirement of 3 years for a long term residence application. 
However, German employers feel worried that BC grantees may easily change their jobs, given that there 
are almost no barriers for this practice within the German context. (Although theoretically the BC holder 
can switch employers only after 2 years, in practice s/he can do it any time if s/he shows that the new job 
matches her/his qualifications.) That is why, German employers support BC applications with caution. 
Luxembourg
An essential feature of Luxembourg’s strong economy is its dependence on the intra-EU mobility: the 
major economic contribution comes from foreigners who are European nationals. The real immigration of 
third-country nationals was initiated only 20 years ago, while their annual increase has been consistently 
very small. Given this, the country is still governed by the Immigration Law of 1972, which operates with 
a very vague high skill migration definition and which has undergone very minor alterations by now. 
Therefore, the Blue Card initiative in Luxembourg has no competitor in a sense at the national level. 5.
The income level requirement can have important 
gendered effects as women migrants tend to receive 
lower pay for the same job and also work in sectors 
that overall have lower pay. It comes as no surprise that 
the number of female Blue Card holders is much lower 
than that of males. 
The Blue Card scheme is insofar under-utilised and 
over-regulated. The Blue Card - as eventually adopted 
by the MS - does not offer access to the EU labour mar-
ket as a whole and is still related to rather cumbersome 
bureaucratic procedures if the highly skilled worker 
wants to take up a job in another EU country. 
Blue Card Cases
The box below summarises the major statistics provided 
by Eurostat for 2013 and the European Commission 
(COM 2014 / 287 Final) on the “success” and “failure” of 
the Blue Card in some EU countries. In this reference, 
it seems reasonable to group the BC policy and practice 
into 3 distinct regional cases that illuminate:3  
1) the tentative success of the Blue Card scheme; 
2) its evident failure; and 
3) the visible (or decontextualized) success.
3      For information on the BC and HSM permit statistics, see: Eurostat, EU Blue Cards by type of decision, occupation and citizenship, 
Extracted on 16.04.2014. For salary thresholds, see: Commission (2014). ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament and the Council on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country na-
tionals for the purpose of highly qualified employment’, COM(2004)287 final, Brussels, 22 May. For different country cases, see: http://
apply.eu/BlueCard/. See also: http://www.bluecard-eu.de/eu-blue-card-germany/.
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Case 2. Failure: The rest of Western Europe
Sweden
Sweden is, in particular, marked by a rather complex bureaucracy around the Blue Card transposition: its 
processing time is significantly longer than for standard HSM work permit applications. While the EU 
Directive implicitly allows for renewal of Blue Cards, Sweden (the only MS) has set an overall time limit 
of 4 years for Blue Card holders, even though there is no explicit rule in the Directive on this point. As a 
result, there have been only 2 Blue Cards issued in Sweden (even despite the fact that it offers additional 
settlement/employment benefits for family reunion in support of unmarried partnership).
The Netherlands
The Netherlands is another country that encourages non-traditional forms of family reunification for 
BC-holders (such as same-sex marriage/partnership) yet where the Blue Card policy is used very rarely. 
The Dutch BC salary threshold is 61,469 Euro, which is 20% higher than for the Dutch Highly Skilled 
Migrant Scheme (52,000 Euro). In 2012, only 10 Blue Cards were issued while in 2011 there were only 
3 Blue Cards granted. At the same time, within the DHSMS there were 1300 national permits given to 
high-skill migrant in 2 years: 2011-2012. The low success of the Blue Card is attributed to its bureaucratic 
prerequisites (filed documents and financial threshold) that are much stricter than for the national high 
skill migration scheme.
Belgium
In Belgium too the Blue Card cannot compete with the Belgian Permit B for HSM, which has a faster 
processing time and a lower threshold: 39, 802 Euro for Permit B versus 51, 465 Euro for BC in 2015.
Case 3. No attraction potential? Southern and Eastern European countries
Romania
The Romanian case shows that in 2012 the number of Blue Cards equalled that of the national work 
permits and in 2013 the Blue Cards even outnumbered the other scheme. However, the overall migratory 
context in Romania shows that national work permits are seldom used in this country as it is not a frequent 
destination for high-skill workforce. For example, the Romanian introduction of the Blue Card in 2012 
was followed by the hope from the Romanian government to particularly attract numbers of Chinese 
entrepreneurs who had been suddenly denied access to Canada due to the abolishment of the Canadian 
Investor/Millionaire Immigration Scheme in the same year. However, most of such wealthy and highly-
skilled migrants have been moving to the US, Hong Kong or even Southern Europe rather than Romania, 
which remains a traditionally uncommon destination for high-skill migrants and entrepreneurs.
Czech Republic
The earlier HSM programme “The Active Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers” actually failed to attract 
many applicants expected because the overall national job market was very restrictive for foreigners, 
which made it difficult to look for jobs and consequently to accumulate necessary credentials for the 
HSM scheme. Moreover, few potential employers were invited to the programme even though there was 
an unmet demand for high-skill workers. Further, the actions of the government may appear kind of 
contradictory as it has opted to exclude from the potential pool of high skill migrants, people coming from 
India and China.
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Blue Card: Fringe Benefits but no Settlement nor  
Mobility Perspectives
All MSs set rather comfortable conditions for the 
BC members’ family reunification: one of the very 
few uniform BC-rules (consistently followed from 
MS to MS) is that spouses and minor children of 
BC-holders can live in the MS, given that the spouse 
can also work full time. 3 MSs (Italy, Sweden and 
Netherlands) advocate more flexible conditions for 
such family reunification by supporting the same sex 
marriage or partnership. Yet in spite of this policy, 
the BC transposition fails in the majority of MSs and 
particularly in the family reunification-friendly Sweden 
and Netherlands. The Commission itself acknowledges 
that family reunification is not a strong factor for 
the potential success of the Blue Card scheme as the 
majority of its holders are males under the age of 35, 
who in many cases may not yet have families of their 
own and therefore may not need to benefit from this 
policy.
Above the financial differences on the national level, 
the barriers are added by the gap between the actual 
duration of the BC (in many countries set at 2 years 
for the first Blue Card issued) in a given MS and the 
long-term residence requirement in the same country, 
usually at 4-6 years minimum. Acquisition of further 
BC extensions is not specified and is probably at the 
discretion of individual MSs and their institutions, 
while the intra-EU mobility is significantly impeded by 
the impossibility to change the employer during the first 
two years of holding the Blue Card. The Commission 
itself further recognises that the complexity is added 
by the novelty of the BC initiative: there are no data 
to assess the practices of its renewal as well as mobility 
plans of its holders.
Blue Card Summary
Member State National High Skill 
Migration Permits 
Issued  
(2012)
 Blue 
Cards 
Issued 
(2012)
Blue 
Cards 
Issued 
(2013)
Blue Card 
Financial 
Threshold 
Conpared 
to National 
Average 
Salary
Max n of 
Years of 
holding Blue 
Card in 1 
Member 
State
Min n of years 
of Residence 
holding Blue 
Card to apply 
for Long-Term 
Residence
Min n of years 
of Residence 
for high Skill 
Migrants to 
apply for Long-
Term Residence
Total* 19,988 
(≈20,000 in 2013)
3,664 15,261 1.5 > NAS 4 GR NA
Germany 210 2,584 14,197 ≈ NAS 4 NA 3 
Luxembourg 21 183 306 =NAS 2 NA 5 
France 3,030 126 304 1.5>NAS 3 GR 5 
The Netherlands 5,514 in 2012 
( 7,400 in 2013)
1 0 1.5>
NAS
2 GR 5
Sweden 4,751 N/A 2 1.7 >NAS 2 NA 4 
Belgium 98 0 5 =NAS 2 NA 5
Romania 0 46 119 >>NAS 2 NA 6
Czech Rep. 69 62 74 >>NAS 2 GR 5
* 24 MS participate in the Blue Card Scheme
NAS – National Average Salary
GR - Generic Rule: 5 years of residence in different MSs, including 2 years of residence in the last MS
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The overall problem with the Blue Card is thus complex: 
it eventually has to do with the limited and quite obscure 
intra-EU mobility rights it guarantees (more in theory 
and less in practice) and also with the fact that it does 
not offer a clear path to permanent migration.
Lessons from Overseas 
The majority of immigrant-receiving OECD countries in 
Europe and beyond have employer-driven preferences 
of high skill migrant workers’ admission (although 
often in combination with the points-based system): in 
the majority of cases, the issued work permit follows 
a specific job offer. Studies on Australia and the USA 
have shown that temporary migration visas addressing 
highly skilled migrants offer best outcomes: selection 
is highly competitive (by employers who sponsor them 
and migrants who manage to get the job offers), this type 
of migrants have high employment outcomes and good 
salaries, and are usually enabled to move on smoothly 
to permanent settlement schemes. Studies have shown 
that this may be a good policy for high skill migration. 
At the same time, this HSM route is not flawless as it 
often ignores the human capital accumulated in the host 
country (in terms of education degrees or professional 
qualifications).  
In response to its cumulated huge immigrant application 
backlog, Canada has also recently modified - or severely 
restricted, to be more precise - its famous Federal Skilled 
Worker Program (FSWP) for HSM. The renovated 
FSWP has distinct features that make it both friendly 
and hostile to HSM. An essential characteristic of the 
FSWP is that it links HSM to permanent residence and 
makes this transition easier for those who are already 
in the country. According to this scheme, qualified 
skilled workers are automatically granted permanent 
residence – a lesson for Europe to learn. The FSWP also 
shows maximum respect to the work/study experience 
in the host country, thus making the progression from 
the student status to the high-skill worker status easier. 
However, this new programme significantly limits the 
access of new high-skill migrants to the country and its 
labour-market.
EU Policy Recommendations
If the EU’s economic recovery requires it competes 
effectively with North America over the international 
talent, it should learn from the North American 
(particularly, Canadian) experience and reform the 
existing Blue Card provisions with the following measures:
• Transition from study to work for third country nationals 
should be made smooth: people who graduate in EU 
countries should be given preferential path to Blue Card 
acquisition.
• The link between the BC duration and the long term 
permit application should be strengthened: the initial BC 
duration should be 5 years so that holders can then apply 
for EU long term residence permit if they wish. 
• The mobility potential of the Blue Card should be 
enhanced by lowering the requirement to stay within the 
same MS to 12 months. This would boost the attractiveness 
of the scheme and would contribute to intra EU mobility 
and meeting of offer and demand.
4  Koslowski, R. (2014). ‘Selective migration policy models and 
changing realities of implementation’,  International Migra-
tion 52(3): 26-39; Lowell, L. and J. Avato (2014). ‘The Wages 
of Skilled Temporary Migrants: Effects of Visa Pathways 
and Job Portability’,  International Migration52(3): 85-98.
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